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Libertarianism holds that agents initially fully own themselves. Lockean libertarianism further 
holds that agents have the moral power to acquire private property in external things as long as a 
Lockean Proviso—requiring that “enough and as good” be left for others—is satisfied. Radical 
right-libertarianism, on the other hand, holds that satisfaction of a Lockean Proviso is not 
necessary for the appropriation of unowned things. This is sometimes defended on the ground 
that the initial status of external resources as unowned precludes any role for a Lockean Proviso. 
I shall show that this is a bad argument. Although I would argue that satisfaction of a Lockean 
Proviso is indeed a necessary condition for the appropriation of unowned things, I shall not 
attempt to establish that here. My goal here is more modest: to rebut one argument against the 
Lockean Proviso. 
The Lockean Proviso can be interpreted in several different ways. Nozickean right-
libertarianism interprets the proviso as requiring that no one be left worse off by the 
appropriation than she would be if the thing remained in common use.1 Equal share left-
libertarianism2 interprets the Lockean Proviso as requiring that no one be worse off than she 
would be if no one appropriated more than an equal share of the competitive value (i.e., based 
on demand and supply) of initially unowned things. Equal opportunity (for wellbeing) left-
libertarianism3 interprets the Lockean Proviso as requiring (roughly) that no one be worse off 
than she would be if no one appropriated more than is compatible with everyone having an 
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equally valuable opportunity for wellbeing.4 
I shall not here assume any particular version of the Lockean Proviso. The arguments 
advanced against it are typically directed at the Nozickean interpretation, but they apply equally 
well to the more egalitarian interpretations. For simplicity, I shall refer to “the” Lockean Proviso. 
 Both radical right-libertarianism and Lockean libertarianism hold that acquiring private 
property over a previously unowned thing requires that the agent perform some suitable action in 
relation to that object. The most familiar account requires that the agent mix her labor with the 
object (whatever exactly that means). Other accounts require that the agent discover the object, 
take possession or control of it, improve it, or merely stake a claim over the object. Virtually all 
accounts require that the agent at least stake a claim in the sense of publicly communicating that 
she now has private property rights over the object. In what follows, I shall leave this issue open, 
but for brevity shall merely write of staking a claim. Our question concerns whether staking a 
claim (or related activities) in an unowned object can be sufficient for acquiring private property 
rights over it, or whether in addition the Lockean Proviso must be satisfied. 
 Before proceeding, let met acknowledge that there is one important argument against the 
Lockean Proviso that I will not consider. Israel Kirzner argues that those who discover the 
existence of a resource, or discover an unknown valuable use for a known resource, are really 
creators of an economic resource. If one believes, as I do, that the property rights of creators over 
their creations are not subject to a Lockean Proviso, then Kirzner’s claim, if correct, provides a 
strong reason for thinking that a Lockean Proviso is not needed in at least many cases of initial 
acquisition. I reject Kirzner’s claim that discoverers are often really creators of the resources in 
question, but defending that rejection is more than I can do in the present paper. Hence, I set that 
argument aside. 
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There are two closely related issues that we shall be examining: (1) Can an individual 
acquire private property rights over a previously unowned thing even when this violates the 
Lockean Proviso? Throughout, I leave implicit that we are addressing cases where no one else 
has consented to the acquisition of such rights. The problematic case for libertarianism is 
appropriation without the consent of others. (2) Does someone commit an injustice if—in 
violation of the Lockean Proviso—she treats a previously unowned thing as if she had private 
property rights over it? The question here is—not whether she acquires private property rights, 
but rather—whether she commits an injustice by acting as if she did. Throughout justice is 
understood as non-violation of rights. 
The idea that the initial unowned status of external things leaves no room for the Lockean 
Proviso to do any work is at least roughly implicit in the writing of many libertarian writers. Jan 
Narveson, for example, writes “[T]he world is [initially] just stuff, devoid of moral qualities and 
not owned by anyone. … The State of Nature is not naturally equipped with any rules 
whatsoever, about anything.”5  The most explicit statement is given by Edward Feser: 
 
Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to 
be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case 
that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A 
commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B would 
have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not 
have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was 
not wronged and could not have been.6 
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Of course, some might question the claim that there are any initially unowned things. One 
might claim, for example, that all external resources are initially jointly owned by all in the sense 
that no one is permitted to use such resources without collective consent of some sort (e.g., 
unanimity or majority). This, of course, is a crazy view and I fully agree that natural resources 
are initially unowned. In any case, we shall assume this for the sake of argument.  
Consider now Feser’s example. Let us agree that, when A uses resource R, A’s use of R 
as such does not violate B’s rights. So far, there is no injustice. No one has any claim-rights over 
the unowned thing. Everyone is initially at liberty—has a liberty-right—with respect to the use 
of the unowned thing.  
A, however, is doing more than simply using R. She is treating R as if she privately 
owned it. Suppose that she uses minimal and reasonable force against B to stop him from using 
R—where this use of force would not violate the rights of B, were A to fully own R. (Private 
property, after all, includes some rights of prior restraint to stop individuals from violating one’s 
property rights.) Does A commit an injustice? Does A, that is, violate B’s rights?  
Here, we must distinguish two cases. In the first, A has R in her physical possession (e.g., 
in her hands), and B uses force against A to obtain R. Here, B violates A’s self-ownership, and A 
is at liberty to use reasonable force against B to stop her from violating B’s self-ownership. In 
this case, A commits no injustice in using force to stop B from using A. This use of force, 
however, is justified by the fact that B is violating A’s self-ownership—and is fully compatible 
with A having no private property rights over B.  
In the second case, A does not have R in her physical possession. She has used R in the 
past (e.g., watered a tree), perhaps with a plan for future use (e.g., gathering apples), but she does 
not currently have the object in her physical possession. Suppose that B comes along and uses R 
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(e.g., gathers some apples) and that A shows up and uses force against B to stop her from using 
R. Does A violate B’s rights? The answer is (1) that she does not violate B’s rights, if in fact A 
has acquired moral private property rights over R (and she is merely enforcing her rights), and 
(2) that she does violate B’s right, if R is still unowned and A is merely treating R as if she 
owned it (and B [typo correction: the published version has “A” here] is still at liberty to use R). 
Thus, we must turn to the first question raised above: Can A acquire private property rights over 
R merely by staking a claim (or other relevant actions)—even when this violates the Lockean 
Proviso? 
The thought, I think, is that, if a thing is unowned, then there is no barrier to the first 
claimant acquiring private property rights over it. After all, if it is unowned, it is, it seems, not 
subject to any moral restrictions. This, I shall argue, is not so. 
No one, we have granted, has any claim-rights concerning the use of an unowned object. 
There is more, however, to the moral order than first order conditions (e.g., claim-rights and 
liberty-rights). There are also second (and higher) order conditions on when lower order 
conditions change. Consider, for example, the moral powers agents have to acquire claim-rights 
over unowned things. The radical right-libertarian claim is that agents have a very strong moral 
power to acquire such claim-rights. All agents have to do is to stake a claim (or engage in related 
activities). This is certainly one possible second order moral view. It is, however, a moral view—
a view about the conditions under which the liberty-rights and claim-rights of individuals are 
altered. It holds, in effect, that agents have a very weak immunity to losing their liberty rights to 
use unowned objects (since some of those liberties are lost whenever someone else stakes a 
claim). No matter what position one takes on how strong the powers of appropriation are, one is 
thereby taking a moral position on the immunity rights that agents have. There is no morally 
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neutral position. Moreover, each of these different second order positions is fully consistent with 
the first order condition of a thing being initially unowned (i.e., no one having any claim-rights 
over it). 
In sum: The first order status of an unowned thing is clear: no one has any claim-rights 
concerning its use (i.e., everyone is at liberty to use it). That leaves open, however, its second 
order status (the conditions under which the first order status can change). One compatible 
position is that individuals can acquire claim-rights over first-order unowned things merely by 
staking a claim (or related activities). Another is that this is so only when the Lockean Proviso is 
satisfied. There are infinitely many other possibilities as well (e.g., whenever the king so 
dictates). Radical right-libertarians are thus mistaken, if they claim that their position follows 
from the mere fact that initially no one has any claim-rights over natural resources. First order 
conditions of morality are compatible with all kinds of second order conditions. 
This does not, of course, establish that radical right-libertarianism is mistaken. It merely 
establishes that one particular argument for it is mistaken. The real work must be done by 
addressing the substantive moral issues of appropriation. It cannot be done simply by appealing 
to the fact that external things are initially unowned.7 
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